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Abstract 
 
This paper considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity 
funds to assess the role of law, corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees in terms 
of their fixed management fees, carried interest performance fees, clawbacks of fees and 
cash versus share distributions of fees.  The data highlight a role of legal conditions in 
shaping fees paid to fund managers.  In countries with better legal conditions, fixed fees are 
lower, carried interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are 
more likely.  These findings suggest legal conditions help to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders.  More specifically, we examine which element of legal conditions matter 
most, and discover that corruption levels play a pronounced role in shaping fund manager 
fee contracts.  We also show that cultural forces such as Hofstede`s measures of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance likewise play a role in influencing fees. 
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Over  the  course  of  the  mid-2007-2009  financial  crisis,  fees  paid  to  financial 
managers  have  been  rigorously  scrutinized.    There  are  numerous  examples  that  have 
become  notorious,  largely  associated  with  government  bailouts  and  subsequent  bonus 
payments.  For example, Sir Fred Goodwin, the former CEO of the Bank of Scotland, 
received fees that led The Economist to refer to him as “dishonorable”.
1  There are blogs 
that cite a deathwatch for Sir Fred Goodwin,
2 just as there were numerous reports of death 
threats for AIG employees after their bonus payments subsequent to government bailouts.
3 
Credit  Suisse  approved in  April  2010  very  controversial  bonus  payments.
4  Similar 
examples are extremely widespread that it is hard to not make the mental connection 
between regulation, corruption, ethics and fees in the financial community. 
 
Likewise, there has been a significant and growing concern in the venture capital 
and private equity industries worldwide has been the presence of corruption in influencing 
fund manager activities.  For example, the la w firm S.J. Berwin noted in their Private 
Equity Comment
5 (March 2010) that: 
Private equity funds, as "active" owners of international businesses, can also be a 
deep pocketed, high profile target for prosecutors looking for someone to bring to book in 
the wake of a corruption investigation involving a portfolio company.  Furthermore, the 
2009 Report on Progress on the UNPRI showed that 46% of asset owners and 36.2% of 
investment managers who had signed up to the Principles cited bribery and corruption as 
"Environmental, Social and Governance" issues" which they addressed when engaging with 
service providers.  It makes good business sense, therefore, for managers to understand the 
legal issues in every country in which the fund does business, and to take active steps to 
ensure that responsible business practices are adopted throughout the portfolio.   
 
S.J. Berwin further commented that the private equity industry worldwide would suffer 
from the longer term effects from the crackdown on corruption for many years to come.  
S.J. Berwin expressed particular concern with international private equity transactions and 
exposure to firms linked to governments and corruption: 
                                                           
1http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=13235025&subj
ectid=987105  
2 http://seekingalpha.com/article/78111-royal-bank-of-scotland-ceo-deathwatch  
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_International_Group  
4http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/Credit_Suisse_avoids_shareholder_bonus_revolt.html?cid=8
785404  
5 http://www.sjberwin.com/latestpublicationdetails.aspx?title=privateequitycomment  2 
 
The case of Vetco Gray UK (which was acquired along with its German parent by 
a consortium of three private equity firms) is a salutary lesson.  Here it was discovered that 
bribes had been paid to Nigerian government officials in relation to oil exploration projects.  
This resulted not only in a record fine by the US Department of Justice of $12 million for 
Vetco  Gray  UK  (which  had  collectively  authorised  the  payments  with  several  of  its 
affiliates) but also the imposition of an independent monitor (at the company's expense) and 
further investigation of the company's activities in other countries, which became binding 
on  any  future  purchaser  of  the  company...  Naturally,  any  areas  identified  as  high-risk 
countries or industries should be treated with care, as should business dealings with state-
linked enterprises and supranational bodies. 
 
  This wave of media coverage and public outrage against fund manager fees in 
recent years suggests a need to better understand the determinants of fund manager fees.  
Fund manager fees comprise many components, including fixed fees, performance based 
fees, clawbacks, and cash versus share payments.   
 
The  fees  contracts  for  fund  managers  of  venture  capital  and  private  equity 
managers are no exception, and thus provide a useful context in which to examine the role 
of law, corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees.  Venture capital and private 
equity funds are typically set up as limited partnerships whereby the institutional investors 
are the limited partners and the fund manager is the general partner (Cumming  et al., 
2005).  Institutional investors include pension funds (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Mayer et al., 
2004)  (which  are  most  common  across  countries),  insurance  companies,  banks  and 
endowments, etc.  Private investment funds typically have a finite life of 10-13 years.  This 
life-span  enables  the  fund  time  to  select  appropriate  investees  and  carry  out  such 
investments to fruition.  A typical investment in an entrepreneurial firm can take from 2-7 
years from first investment to the exit date.  Entrepreneurial firms typically lack income, 
revenue and/or cash flows to pay interest on debt and dividends on equity; hence, returns to 
institutional  investors  are  in  the  form  of  capital  gains  upon  exit  (such  as  an  IPO  or 
acquisition for successful entrepreneurial firms, or a write-off for unsuccessful firms).  
 
  Private fund managers are compensated with a two-part fee.  The first part is a 
fixed fee which is commonly 1-3% of the fund‟s assets in the U.S. (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999a,  b),  and  paid  per  year.    This  enables  an  appropriate  annual  salary  for  the  fund 
managers and enables the fund managers to meet overhead costs over the life-span of the 
fund, particularly in times prior to the realization of investments in the investee firms.  The 
second component is the performance fee, or carried interest, which is commonly 20% of 
the profits earned by successful fund investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a,b).  Fixed 3 
 
fees are higher and performance fees are lower among younger funds, which is consistent 
with a learning model whereby risk adverse fund managers are more likely to prefer more 
certain compensation when their abilities are unknown to themselves (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999a, 1999b).  Fund managers may face clawbacks from their fees, which means that 
institutional  investors  in  funds  can  reduce  fees  in  the  event  of  poor  performance.  
Institutional investors into funds can state in limited partnership contracts that payment 
terms come in the form of cash or share distributions. 
 
  In this paper we compare and contrast the role of fund manager characteristics and 
market  conditions  to  the  legal  and  institutional  setting  in  which  a  fund  is  based  to 
understand the determinants of fund manager fees.  We expect market conditions and fund 
manager characteristics to be important in setting fees, as these factors would be important 
in any labor market context.  In respect of legal and institutional differences, we compare 
and contrast the role of legal conditions versus cultural conditions in a country to ascertain 
the importance of country-specific factors on fees.  We expect countries with superior legal 
settings to affect fees in a way that better aligns the interests of fund managers with their 
investors, as shown in prior work with a sample of 50 venture capital funds worldwide 
(Cumming and Johan, 2009).  We extend prior work in two important dimensions.  First, 
we obtain a much larger and more recent sample to assess the robustness of prior findings.  
Second,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  we  explore  for  the  first  time  the  effect  of  the 
specific features of a country‟s legal and institutional setting on fees, including different 
components of legal conditions (specific indices from La Porta et al. 1998) as well as 
cultural dimensions on fees (Hofstede‟s cultural indices). 
 
  Based on a sample of 123 venture capital and private equity  funds around the 
world, we find that in countries with better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried 
interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are more likely.  
These findings support the idea that legal conditions help to align the interests of managers 
and  shareholders.    We  extend  our  empirical  analyses  to  ascertain  what  specific  legal 
conditions matter across countries.  We find that corruption levels play a pronounced role 
in shaping fund manager fee contracts across countries.  For example, corruption is the 
only significant legal determinant of setting fixed fees such that fixed fees are lower in less 
corrupt countries.  We also show that cultural forces such as Hofstede`s measures of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance likewise play a role in influencing fees.  Overall, it is 
noteworthy that laws and culture are much more significant in determining fees than fund 
manager characteristics and/or market conditions. 
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  Our paper is related to a growing the literature on law and finance associated with 
financial  intermediation.    Prior  work  has  shown  that  fees  depend  on  legal  conditions 
(Cumming and Johan, 2009) but the dearth of data in that work with 50 observations led to 
inconclusive statements about what specifically matters in terms of specific attributes of a 
legal  system  that  affects  fees.    Other  related  evidence  has  shown  legal  systems  affect 
venture capital financial contracts with entrepreneurs and investment performance (Lerner 
and Schoar, 2005; Hege et al., 2009; Cumming and Johan, 2009), as do cultural factors 
across  countries  (Hazarika  et  al.,  2009).    Our  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by 
examining  how  specific  legal  and  cultural  differences  across  countries  matter  for  fee 
structures. 
 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 considers the institutional context 
and develops hypotheses pertaining to the determinants of fees.  The data and summary 
statistics  are  presented  in  section  3.    Empirical  tests  follow  in  section  4.    Concluding 




  In  subsection  2.1  we  first  briefly  outline  predictions  in  regards  to  the  relation 
between legal conditions and managerial compensation.  Thereafter in subsection 2.2 we 
discuss the importance of certain control variables. 
 
2.1. Law, Culture and Fund Manager Compensation 
 
Private fund managers are financial intermediaries between institutional investors 
and entrepreneurial firms.  Institutional investors do not have the time and specialized skill 
set to carry out due diligence in screening potential private entrepreneurial firms in which 
to invest; institutional investors also do not have the time and skills to efficiently monitor 
and add value to the investee entrepreneurial firms.  The pronounced risks, information 
asymmetries and agency problems associated with investments in small, illiquid, and high-
tech entrepreneurial firms is a primary explanation for the existence of private investment 
funds with specialized skill sets to mitigate such problems (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999a,b).  
 
We expect countries with superior legal settings to affect fees in a way that better 
aligns  the  interests  of  fund  managers  with  their  investors.    Legal  conditions  can  be 
measured in a variety of ways, such as the many indices developed by La Porta et al. 5 
 
(1998) and others.  The traditional La Porta et al. (1998) indices include  efficiency of 
judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, 
and shareholder rights.  A weighted average of these indices was adopted by Berkowitz et 
al. (2003), and referred to as the Legality Index.  It is natural to expect these indices to 
matter for cross-country determinants in fees, not because these indices were developed for 
limited partnerships, but rather because they affect the uncertainty faced by fund managers 
in carrying out their investments in those countries and as such their expected incomes. 
 
  Similarly, as fee contracts are the outcome of bargaining between fund managers 
and their institutional investors, and bargaining depends on culture in different countries, 
we may expect cultural measures developed by Hofstede to matter in setting fees.  These 
cultural dimensions are as follows:
6 
 
Power Distance Index (PDI) that is the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from 
above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much 
as by the leaders. Power and inequality, of course, are extremely fundamental facts of any 
society and anybody with some international experience will be aware that 'all societies are 
unequal, but some are more unequal than others'. 
  
Individualism (IDV) on the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, that is the degree to 
which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in 
which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself 
and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people 
from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families 
(with  uncles,  aunts  and  grandparents)  which  continue  protecting  them  in  exchange  for 
unquestioning loyalty. The word 'collectivism' in this sense has no political meaning: it 
refers to the group, not to the state. Again, the issue addressed by this dimension is an 
extremely fundamental one, regarding all societies in the world. 
  
Masculinity  (MAS)  versus  its  opposite,  femininity,  refers  to  the  distribution  of  roles 
between the genders which is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range of 
solutions are found. The IBM studies revealed that (a) women's values differ less among 
societies  than  men's  values;  (b)  men's  values  from  one  country  to  another  contain  a 
dimension  from  very  assertive  and  competitive  and  maximally  different  from  women's 
values on the one side, to modest and caring and similar to women's values on the other. 
                                                           
6 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/  6 
 
The assertive pole has been called 'masculine' and the modest, caring pole 'feminine'. The 
women  in  feminine  countries  have  the  same  modest,  caring  values  as  the  men;  in  the 
masculine countries they are somewhat assertive and competitive, but not as much as the 
men, so that these countries show a gap between men's values and women's values. 
  
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) deals with a society's tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity; it ultimately refers to man's search for Truth. It indicates to what extent a culture 
programs  its  members  to  feel  either  uncomfortable  or  comfortable  in  unstructured 
situations.  Unstructured  situations  are  novel,  unknown,  surprising,  different  from  usual. 
Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict 
laws and rules, safety and security measures, and on the philosophical and religious level 
by a belief in absolute Truth;  'there can only be one Truth and  we have it'. People in 
uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and motivated by inner nervous 
energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions 
different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, and on the 
philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by 
side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected 
by their environment to express emotions. 
 
  Consistent with Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), we conjecture that fund managers 
operating in legal conditions of poor quality will be more inclined to accept higher fixed 
fees and lower performance fees.  At a general level, information asymmetries are more 
pronounced in countries with poor legal conditions, and therefore less developed countries 
are less likely to employ incentive contracts for managers and entrepreneurs (Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti, 1999).  Specifically in the venture capital context, prior empirical work is 
consistent with the view that countries with weaker legal conditions (based on the La Porta 
et al., 1998, indices) face more uncertain exit markets whereby it is more difficult to obtain 
a capital gain and generate fund returns (Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming et al., 2005).  
As such, we expect risk adverse fund managers to prefer higher fixed fees in exchange for 
a lower performance fees in order to garner a more certain income stream in countries with 
weaker legal conditions.  Similarly, we expect cultural attributes in a country to affect fees, 
as Power Distance, Individualism and Masculinity relate to disparity in fees or lower fixed 
fees and higher performance fees, while uncertainity avoidance is associated with higher 
fixed fees and lower performance fees. 
 
H1:  Fixed management fee percentages will be in higher in countries with a 
weaker Legality Index, and in countries with less Power Distance, Individualism 
and Masculinity, and higher Uncertainty Avoidance. 7 
 
 
H2:  Carried interest performance fee percentages will be higher in countries 
with  a  higher  Legality  Index,  and  in  countries  with  more  Power  Distance, 
Individualism and Masculinity, and lower Uncertainty Avoidance. 
 
  While fund managers benefit from higher fixed fees and lower performance fees in 
countries with poor legal conditions, institutional investors nevertheless face a particularly 
pronounced risk of lower profits among funds in countries with poor laws.  Institutional 
investors can lower the downside costs of low returns with the mechanism of a “clawback”.  
A clawback means institutional investors reduce the compensation paid to fund managers 
in the event of poor performance. A fund usually distributes cash and other proceeds to the 
fund  manager and  other  investors  upon  each  liquidating  event. The problem  of excess 
distributions may occur when earlier liquidations are profitable, and later ones are not. This 
will  be  further  exacerbated  if  the  fund  manager  accelerates  the  sale  of  profitable 
investments and holds off the liquidation of bad investments. The clawback allows the 
investors to recover excess distributions upon liquidation of the fund.
7 We therefore expect 
clawbacks to be more frequently employed in countries with poorer legal conditions.  We 
likewise expect clawbacks to be more common in countries with greater Power Distance as 
it directly reflects bargaining power amongst fund managers and institutional investors. 
 
H3:  Clawbacks of fund manager fees in the event of poor performance are more 
common in countries with a weaker Legality Index and greater Power Distance. 
 
  We further expect legal conditions to influence the mode of distribution of fund 
profits to institutional investors in terms of cash versus share distributions.  Poor legal 
conditions increase the financial risk of share positions in entrepreneurial firms; therefore, 
all  else  being  equal,  the  greater  the  uncertainty  created  by  a  lower  quality  legal 
environment, the greater the probability of a cash-only distribution policy in the setup of a 
private fund. 
 
H4:  The weaker the legal environment, the greater the probability of covenants 
mandating cash-only distributions from fund managers to institutional investors. 
                                                           
7  See  http://vcexperts.com/vce/library/encyclopedia/glossary_view.asp?glossary_id=188  for  a 
formal definition of clawbacks: “A clawback obligation represents the general partner‟s promise 
that,  over  the  life  of  the  fund,  the  managers  will  not  receive  a  greater  share  of  the  fund‟s 
distributions than they bargained for. Generally, this means that the general partner may not keep 
distributions representing more than a specified percentage (e.g., 20%) of the fund‟s cumulative 
profits, if any. When triggered, the clawback will require that the general partner return to the fund‟s 
limited partners an amount equal to what is determined to be "excess" distributions.” 8 
 
 
Finally, in an international context private investment funds can be set up offshore, 
and doing so typically has significant tax advantages.  In the US, share distributions are 
common as the institutional investor can decide when it is the best time to realize capital 
gains (There are other reasons for share distributions, see e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999b, 
1997). Since offshore funds are by their very nature tax lowering entities, the timing of 
realization of capital gains is a less pronounced concern among institutional investors of 
offshore  funds,  and  therefore  the  need  for  share  distributions  is  less  pronounced  for 
offshore  funds.    Furthermore,  aside  from  concerns  relating  to  taxation,  offshore  funds 
commonly  comprise  of  various  types  of  institutional  investors,  such  as  pension  funds, 
insurance companies, banks, and endowments from a diverse set of countries.  Institutional 
investors from a diverse set of countries typically face non-harmonized legal impediments 
to acquiring and selling shares in entrepreneurial firms transferred to them from the fund 
manager.    Overall,  therefore,  offshore  funds  are  expected  to  mandate  cash-only 
distributions. 
 
H5:  Offshore funds are more likely to mandate cash-only distributions from 
fund managers to institutional investors. 
 
2.3. Control Variables for Analysing Managerial Compensation across Countries 
 
  Fund manager compensation quite plausibly is influenced by a variety of factors 
pertaining to economic conditions, institutional investor and fund manager characteristics, 
including  education  and  experience  as  well  as  fund  factors such  as  stage  and  industry 
focus, among other factors.  We briefly discuss each of these factors in this subsection. 
 
First, in regards to economic conditions, where the demand for fund managers 
exceeds supply, fund managers are more likely to be compensated better.  For instance, in 
the boom periods a phenomenon of “money chasing deals” (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) 
typically results, whereby fund managers are short in supply relative to the institutional 
investors wanting to contribute to the asset class (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2004).  As 
such,  fund  managers  are  more  likely  to  have  higher  fixed  fees  and  carried  interest 
percentages, and less likely to face clawbacks, in times of boom economic conditions (i.e., 




Second, apart from overall legal quality conditions, specific legal environments 
pertaining  to  legal  origin  might  influence  fee  structures  (La  Porta  et  al.,  1997,  1998).  
Cultural differences across regions may also be closely to legal origin variables. 
 
Third, partnership profits from limited partnership funds (carried interest) may be 
taxed at the capital gains tax rate or deemed as business income and taxed at the income tax 
rate  (unlike venture capital firms set up as corporations) (Fleishcher, 2005).  As such, we 
control  for  the  difference  between  income  tax  and  capital  gains  tax  rates  for  limited 
partnership funds. 
 
Fourth, fund managers that have more education are more likely to receive higher 
fixed and performance fees, and less likely to face clawbacks.  Fund managers with more 
relevant  work  experience  are  more  likely  to  have  lower  fixed  fees  but  higher  carried 
interest percentages (consistent with the signalling model as discussed in Gompers and 
Lerner , 1999). 
 
Fifth, fund characteristics such as fund size, stage focus and industry focus can 
affect fees (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a). Larger funds are more likely to have smaller 
fixed fees simply because the fixed compensation would be excessive.  Funds focused on 
investing in earlier stages of development and in more high tech industries are more likely 
to have higher performance fees to incentivise the fund managers and align their interests 
with that of the institutional investors (since agency problems and information asymmetries 
are more pronounced among funds focused in early stage and high-tech investments). 
 
Sixth, the type of institutional investor (bank, government, pension fund, etc.) and 
their respective risk tolerance levels could influence the pay structure of the fund managers 
in terms of fixed versus managerial fees (for reasons analogous to research in Mayer et al., 
2004, and Lerner et al., 2005).  As well, the identity of the institutional investors could of 
course affect the probability of use of clawbacks and the mode of distributions in terms of 
cash versus shares. 
 
In the empirical analyses of the hypotheses outlined in subsection 2.1, these and 
other  control  variables  identified  in  this  subsection  are  used.    The  data  and  summary 
statistics are described in the next section.  Thereafter in section 4 multivariate empirical 
tests are provided.  A discussion of limitations, alternative explanation, future research and 





3.1 Methods and survey instrument 
 
The data used in this study come mainly from a survey conducted over the period 
December 2009 and March 2010. The aim of our study is therefore to present a new set of 
international data corresponding to other countries in the world. The data on fund structure, 
their size and their investments are mostly available on the financial databases. Otherwise, 
details  of the  fees structure  of  general  partners,  the  terms  of  recoveries  and the  profit 
distribution policy used by the fund (cash against shares) are not publicly revealed by all 
funds in some countries. On the other hand, most of the agreements used to govern the 
relationship between managers and investors in the fund are generally written in different 
languages, so it was necessary to obtain the data by use of surveys and interviews that 
allow collecting pertinent information. Funds publications on their websites were however 
used to verify and enhance data obtained by survey and interviews. 
 
We  integrate  in  our  sample  all  investment  funds  without  distinction  between 
private equity funds or venture capital funds. The data collected can be classified into six 
different groups, which are summarized in Table 1: 
-  The  data  related  to  the  compensation  of  the  management  partners:  %  of 
management fees, % of carried interest performance fees, the application of the 
clawbacks  clause,  the  distribution  of  cash  to  institutional  investors  instead  of 
shares. 
-  The legal conditions of the country measured by the legality index (La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998). The legality index is derived from a principal components analysis of 
the covariance matrix from the five observed legality variables (Berkowitz, Pistor, 
and Richard 2000).  
-  The  country's  economic  conditions:  the  GNP  per  capita,  the  MSCI  Index,  the 
Industry  market  /  book  ratio  calculated  according  to  the  sectors  targeted  by 
investment funds. 
-  The characteristics of institutional investors: the proportion of banks institutional 
investors, government investors...  
-  The  characteristics  of  the  fund:  funds  size,  funds  organization  (Partnership, 
Liability Company ...), companies target by funds... 
-  Characteristics associated to the fund managers specially their training level (the 
proportion of MBA, CFA or PhD trained fund managers) and relevant experience. 
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[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
3.2. Potential sample selection bias 
 
To summarize, the different sources used in collecting data from the study are as 
follows: 
-  The  database  Thomson  One  Banker  allowed  us  to  collect  specific  information 
about funds as its size, creation date and the target firms of the funds...  
-  The Datastream database allowed us to collect economic information about each 
country of the sample: the GNP, the MSCI, the Industry Market to Book ratio. 
-  A questionnaire was sent to officers, general partners and members of management 
funds.  Some  respondents  preferred  a  telephone  interview.  The  questionnaire 
allowed gathering non-published information about general partners (such as their 
training level, their professional experience, their compensation) 
 
Those potential interviewees were identified from various sources such as: 
(1) The Kompass database for the case of French fund managers 
(2) The  database  Thomson  One  banker  to  collect  the  email  addresses  of  fund 
management teams internationally.  
(3) The websites of investment funds.  
 
The survey was sent to approximately 2,500 investment funds in the world by 
using software for online survey (WysuForms). It has mainly sought the partnership of 
managers  of  such  funds  in  the  survey  with  the  promise  that  their  results  will  be 
communicated to the end of the study. We have verified that a single response is validated 
for each investment fund. Furthermore, there is a limit in the method of collecting survey 
data  in  particular  selection  bias  in  the  sample.  Knowing  that  this  bias  is  possible,  we 
believe that, after detailed analysis of responses obtained confirm we prove that this bias is 
avoided in this type of study. 
 
One  limitation  to  obtaining  data  through  a  survey  is  the  possibility  of  sample 
selection bias. While we acknowledge that this is a possibility, we believe from a detailed 
analysis  of  the  responses  received  and  the  data  obtained  from  the  responses  that  this 
concern does not arise in this exercise. First, survey data were gathered for a final sample 
of 123 funds in 23 countries. We are aware that the seminal work carried out by Gompers 
and Lerner (1996) utilized a sample of 140 contracts used to establish funds, obtained from 
institutional investors (two fund of funds and one endowment). Litvak (2004b) has data 12 
 
from 38 funds in the US, and Metrick and Yasuda (2006) have data from 203 funds in the 
US. We believe however that by obtaining data from funds situated both in and outside the 
US, and by having access to data regarding contracts entered into by 123 different fund 
managers in 23 countries, response bias is mitigated as much as possible. Similarly, Lerner, 
and Schoar‟s (2005) study of the relation between legality and venture capital contracts 
with entrepreneurs is based on data from 28 fund managers. Limitations in our sample size 
from each country from which we derived data, as well as the limited information about 
venture  capital  and  private  equity  funds  around  the  world,  however,  makes  reliable 
statistical comparisons of our sample relative to the population of funds intractable. Our 
sample of respondent funds includes twenty-one funds from France, fourteen funds from 
the US, twelve funds from the UK, eleven funds from the Netherlands and, eight funds 
from Malaysia, six funds from Germany, five funds each from Australia, Finland and South 
Africa, four funds each from Brazil and the Netherlands Antilles, three funds each from the 
Philippines Belgium, Canada, India, Italy,Spain and Switzerland, two funds each from the 
Cayman Islands and Mexico, and one fund each from the New Zealand Singapore and 
Luxembourg (see Table 2).  The number of respondents, and representation of funds from 
both  developed and emerging  private equity  markets,  makes  a response bias even less 
likely. 
 
Second, a broad array of respondents replied to the survey. For example, the data 
show  the  median  respondent  fund  size  of  US$70.900.000  and  the  average  being 
US$144.667.818  (minimum  US$263.377,5;  maximum  US$930.000.000),  indicating  that 
respondents were of a variety of fund sizes and of typical size for a sample of non-US 
countries. The possibility of sample selection bias is further reduced by the presence of 
both onshore and offshore funds within the final sample, the presence of funds organized 
not only in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, but also within jurisdictions in 
legal systems with English, French, Scandinavian and German based legal systems, and 
also the presence of funds situated in countries where English is not the primary language. 
Finally, a sufficient number of variables regarding both fund and fund manager 
organization  and  the  relevant  features  of  the  fund  asset  size,  fund  vintage,  investor 
composition,  investment  strategy,  industry  composition  of  fund  investments  and 
governance  structures,  more  specifically  the  specific  covenants  provided  in  the  terms 
within  the  agreements  that  govern  the  relationship  between  fund  investors  and  fund 
manager, were collected to minimize the risk of response bias. We also sought information 
on  the  method  of  calculating  management  fees,  the  treatment  of  other  fees  such  as 
consulting and monitoring fees, and profit sharing and distribution terms. We unfortunately 13 
 
realize that we cannot absolutely rule out the possibility of a response bias as the data we 
have collected here is unique. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
 
The  summary  statistics  are  presented  in  Table  3.  In  the  data  the  average 
performance fee is 18.01%, and the median performance fee is 20%. The average fixed fee 
is  2.32%,  and  the  median  fixed  fee  is  2.5%.  Thirty  four  of  the  123  funds  imposed 
clawbacks against fund managers in the event of poor performance; the degree of these 
clawbacks was most often 20% of the fund manager fees. Eighty seven of the 123 funds 
mandated cash-only distributions. 
 
The level of the legality index for each country is indicated in Table 2, and for all 
countries together in Table 3.  The legality index is a weighted average of the legal index 
variables introduced by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), as defined by Berkowitz, Pistor, and 
Richard (2003). Each of the components of the legality index is highly pertinent to venture 
finance, and comprise the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, risk 
of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, and shareholder rights. It is calculated as 
follows: 
Legality Index = 0.381* (Efficiency of the Judiciary) + 0.5778* (Rule of Law) + 0.5031* 
(Corruption) + 0.3468* (Risk of Expropriation) + 0.3842* (Risk of Contract Repudiation) 
The legality index is an appropriate focus of our analysis, in view of the fact that the 
components of the legality index are very highly correlated, and to focus on a subset of 
indices within the component of legality to avoid the collinearity problem might tend to 
have the appearance of data mining. Moreover, as we have a relatively small number of 
observations, a focus on a weighted average legal index suitably mitigates the possibility of 
incorrect statistical inferences with outlier observations and the inclusion or exclusion of 
certain  countries  in  the  data.  A  higher  legality  index  indicates  better  substantive  legal 
content pertaining to investing, the quality and likelihood of enforcement. Higher numbers 
indicate „better‟ legal systems across each of the factors. Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2, Table 4 shows a strong positive correlation (0.51) between the legality index 
and performance fees and a strong negative correlation (-0.62) between the legality index 
and fixed fees. 
 




Eighteen per cent of the funds in the data are outbound offshore funds, and 8% are 
inbound offshore funds. As indicated in Table 1, an outbound offshore fund is one that 
obtains its capital from investors from a certain jurisdiction but fund investments are made 
primarily in assets other than in the jurisdiction of the fund and the fund investors. With 
reference to US jurisdictional boundaries, a fund will be considered to be an outbound 
offshore fund if it obtains capital from US investors, but it invests outside the US. An 
inbound  offshore  fund  is  one  that  obtains  its  capital  from  investors  from  various 
jurisdictions but fund investments are made primarily in assets in a certain jurisdiction. 
With reference to US jurisdictional boundaries, an inbound offshore fund will be a fund 
located offshore that invests primarily in assets within the US yet obtains its capital from 
non-US investors.  
 
As these distinctions appear to be important in practice for private investment fund 
management in an international setting, we control for these variables in our empirical 
analyses.  
 
A majority of funds are managed by MBA graduates, and a typical fund manager 
has relevant work experience of about 15.5 years. Science and law graduates exist among 
some of the funds in the data, and some fund managers had partial training (i.e. some non-
degree courses) in law and/or sciences (and this partial training is reflected in our data by 
recording  the  proportionate  number  of  years  of  training).  We  control  for  the  specific 
training of the fund managers in our empirical tests.  
 
Seventy-two of 123 funds were set up as limited partnerships, and the remainder 
were set up as limited liability companies or trusts (see e.g. Cumming and Walz 2004; 
Cumming,  Fleming,  and  Suchard  2005  and  accompanying  text  on  limited  partnerships 
versus other types of fund structures). Thirty one per cent had a pure venture capital (early-
stage) focus, and most had a significant exposure to high-tech industries (as reflected by 
the industry market/book ratio of the investee firms in which the fund had invested). The 
range across each of the different funds and countries for these and the other variables is 







4. Econometric Tests 
 
4.1. Econometric Methods 
 
  We analyse four different dependent variables in this section: fixed fees (Table 5), 
Carried  interest  performance  fees  (Table  6),  clawbacks  (Table  7)  and  cash-only 
distributions (Table 8).  The various right-hand-side explanatory variables were identified 
in section 3 and defined in Table 1.  For each dependent variable we provide 7 alternative 
sets of regressions to show robustness (for a total of 28 different models, consecutively 
numbered across Tables 5 – 8).  Tables 5 and 6 make use of standard OLS regression 
methods corrected for heteroskedasticity with White‟s estimator (1980).  The dependent 
variable in Tables 5 and 6 are bounded below by zero and above by one; we considered 
different methods of estimating fractions (Bierens, 2003), but did not find any material 
differences to the conclusions drawn.  Alternative specifications are available upon request.  
The dependent variables in Tables 7 and 8 are binary variables; as such, we make use of 
simple logit regressions and again correct for heterockedasticity. Marginal effects for the 
logit models were computed using Data Analysis and Statistical Software (Stata).  The 
results are also robust to inclusion / exclusion of most of the countries in the data and 
potential outliers.
8   
 
We use logs of the right -hand-side variables (except the dummy variables) to 
reduce the weight of outlier observations and account for diminishing effects.  Again, the 
results are quite robust and alternative specifications are available upon request.  In section 
5 we describe various other elements of the data, including alternative definitions of 
variables and variables not employed for reasons of conciseness. 
 
[Insert Tables 5-8 About Here] 
 
4.2. Regression Results 
 
The regression results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that legal conditions by far have 
the most statistically and economically significant effect on fixed fees and performance 
compensation.    Table  5  indicates  fixed  fees  are  significantly  lower  in  countries  with 
stronger legal conditions, and this result is robust to any of the different specifications in 
                                                           
8 One exception to the robustness of results to exclusion of countries is that where the number of 
observations is significantly reduced by excluding countries, some of the results reported are not 
robust.  Excluding countries with just one fund did not affect the primary results reported. 16 
 
Models 1-5, among others not presented.  This strongly supports H1 outlined above in 
subsection 2.1.  Further, Table 6 indicates legality is the most economically and statistically 
significant variable in explaining performance fees, strongly in support of H2.  In regards 
to the economic significance, based on the legal numbers indicated in Table 2, the data 
indicate  that  a  move  from  the  Brazil  to  the  Switzerland  (one  of  the  most  extreme 
improvements in legal conditions in our data) gives rise to a reduction in fixed fees by 
approximately 1.5%, and an increase in performance fees by approximately 10%.  A more 
modest improvement in legal conditions from the Brazil to Germany, for example, gives 
rise to a reduction in fixed fees by approximately 1% and an increase in performance fees 
by 8.42%.   
 
These results are robust to the inclusion and/or exclusion of controls for a variety 
of  factors  including  market  conditions,  institutional  investor  and  fund  manager 
characteristics, including education and experience as well as fund factors such as stage 
and industry focus, among other control variables available shown explicitly in the tables 
(among other considered in the new detailed international dataset, but excluded for reasons 
of conciseness). 
 
  Some of the control variables are significant in Tables 5 and 6 in ways that are 
expected (as described in subsection 2.2).  Larger funds have lower fixed fees (Table 5).  
Ph.D.‟s  are  more  likely  to  have  higher  performance  fees  (Table  6,  but  this  effect  is 
significant only in Model 11).  The presence of government investors gives rise to larger 
fixed fees, and funds focused in high-tech industries (with higher market/book ratios) are 
more likely to have smaller fixed fees. Managers with extensive work experience are more 
likely to have higher carried interest (this effect is statistically significant but not very 
robust on model 10, 11 and 13). The other variables, however, are generally insignificant 
and/or not robust.  For example, differences between income and capital gains tax rates do 
not affect fixed fees versus management fees.  Overall, therefore, the most robust variable 
is legality for explaining international differences in fixed and performance fees. 
 
The model 6 and 7 show that the corruption, a component of the legality index has 
a negative and significant effect on fixed fees. Countries with high corruption index have 
low management fees. However, almost all the components of the Legality index have a 
significant  effect  on  the  level  of  carried  interest.  The  efficiency  of  Judiciary  System 
induces  higher  carried  interest  but  the  risk  of  expropriation  and  corruption  reduce  the 
preference  of  fund  managers  to  receive  variable  compensation  depending  on  funds 
„performance.   17 
 
 
Introducing  the  cultural  dimensions  of  Hofstede  in model  7,  shows that  Power 
Distance Index and Individualism have a negative and significant effect on the level of 
management  fees.    Anxiety  about  the  unknown,  measured  by  Uncertainty  Avoidance 
Index, induces general partners to require higher management fees (significant result in 
model 7 of table 5). 
 
As in Tables 5 and 6, Table 7 indicates that the legal environment is the most 
statistically  and  economically  significant  determinant  of  clawbacks  among  private 
investment funds across countries, strongly supporting H3 (subsection 2.1).  In terms of the 
economic  significance,  a  reduction  in  the  quality  of  legal  conditions  increases  the 
probability of clawbacks by approximately 33% for a move from Brazil than Germany, and 
approximately 50% for a move from Brazil than Switzerland. 
 
It is important to stress the asymmetric relation between legality and fund manager 
compensation.  Fund managers have higher fixed fees and lower incentive fees in countries 
with  weak  legal  conditions  (Tables  5  and  6).    But in  regards to  penalty  clauses, fund 
managers in countries with weak legal conditions are more likely to face the downside risk 
of a clawback on their fees (Table 7).  The intuition underlying this asymmetric result is 
possible explained by the fact that risk adverse fund managers trade off a higher fixed fee 
for  a  lower  performance  fee  when  legal  conditions  are  weak,  while  risk  adverse 
institutional investors are more likely to require clawbacks to protect against downside risk 
in countries with poor laws. 
 
The  only  other  significant  and robust  variable  in Table  7 for  clawbacks is the 
MSCI index (model 20).  In better market conditions across time, fund managers are less 
likely  to  face  clawbacks.    This  is  consistent  with  results  in  previous  work  (See  e.g. 
Gompers  and  Lerner,  1999a,b,  2000  for  empirical  work;  Kanniainen  and  Keuschnigg, 
2004) for theoretical work) which shows demand and supply conditions affect fees.  When 
there is money chasing deals (excess capital flowing from institutional investors to private 
investment funds for the given inelastic supply of private investment fund managers), fund 
managers receive more favourable deal terms from their institutional investors. 
   
In regards to the economic significance of legality in Tables 5 and 6, note that 
when GNP per capita is included alongside the legality index, the statistical significance of 
legality  is  not  affected  but  the economic  significance  is  affected.   The  reason  for  this 
change is the high correlation between legality and GNP per capita (see Table 4).  Given 18 
 
the bias introduced by simultaneously including both legality and GNP per capita, we feel 
much more confident with the economic significance associated with only including the 
legality  index  without the  GNP  per  capita  variable.    Note  as  well  in Table 7  that  the 
simultaneous  inclusion  of  GNP  per  capita  and  legality  gives  rise  to  a  statistically 
insignificant relation between legality and the probability of use of clawbacks.  Again, this 
is due to the high correlation between legality and GNP per capita (Table 4).  
Model 21 of table 7, shows that the Power Distance Index is the only cultural dimension 
that  significantly  affect  clawbacks.  When  the  acceptance  of  inequality  of  power  is 
emphasized in a given country, the probability of use of clawbacks will be higher.     
 
Table  8  analyses  the  relation  between  legality  and  payment  terms  to  a  fund‟s 
institutional investors in terms of cash versus share distributions from realized investments 
in entrepreneurial firms.  The Logit regression indicates a robust relation between legality 
and cash distributions in Model 23. The other models 22, 25 and 26 are less significant but 
showed the same relation (These results confirm the hypothesis H4 in subsection 2.1): cash 
only distributions are more likely in countries with weak legal conditions. 
 
Much  more  significantly  in  Table  8,  however,  is  the  result  that  institutional 
investors mandate cash-only distributions for off-shore funds.  The estimates coefficients 
for legality in Models 22-27 provides very strong support for H5 outlined in subsection 2.1.  
In regards to the economic significance, institutional investors are approximately 77.78% 
more likely to require cash-only distributions when the fund is established as an offshore 
fund.  As conjectured and explained in subsection 2.1, this finding is consistent with the 
view that share distributions for tax reasons are less meaningful since offshore funds are 
already tax pass through entities.  Furthermore, institutional investors in an offshore fund 
are commonly from a diverse set of countries, and they typically face non-harmonized legal 
impediments to selling shares in entrepreneurial firms transferred to them from the fund 
manager.    Hence,  it  is  much  more  efficient  for  liquidity  reasons  to  have  cash-only 
distributions among offshore fund structures. 
 
The  other  significant  and  robust  variable  in  Table  8  for  Cash  versus  Share 
Distributions is the Legality index.  In terms of the economic significance, a reduction in 
the quality of legal conditions increases the probability that institutional investors mandate 
cash-only distributions. On the other hand, better market conditions illustrated by a higher 
GNP per Capita in model 22 or a higher MSCI index in model 24, 25 and 27 have a 
positive effect on Cash Distributions. Institutional investors will rather prefer to receive 





  There has been a growing concern over fee structures since the financial crisis.  
International law firms such as S.J. Berwin have been highlighting the role of corruption 
and law in setting fees and governance in the private equity industry: “Private equity funds 
that use agents, advisers or consultants to conduct business on their behalf without proper 
due diligence, training or monitoring, and business partners that lack transparency in their 
books and records should also place the fund on alert, as should unusual or unclear sales 
timings, transactions or payment routes, and any non-standard contractual terms.” 
 
  Based on a sample of 123 venture  capital and private equity funds around the 
world, we find that in countries with better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried 
interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are more likely.  
These findings support the idea that legal conditions help to align the interests of managers 
and  shareholders.    We  extend  our  empirical  analyses  to  ascertain  what  specific  legal 
conditions matter across countries.  We find that corruption levels play a pronounced role 
in shaping fund manager fee contracts across countries.  For example, corruption is the 
only significant legal determinant of setting fixed fees such that fixed fees are lower in less 
corrupt countries.  We also show that cultural forces such as Hofstede`s measures of power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance likewise play a role in influencing fees.  Overall, it is 
noteworthy that laws and culture are much more significant in determining fees than fund 
manager characteristics and/or market conditions. 
 
  Consistent with the theoretical work Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999), risk adverse 
private fund managers substitute fixed compensation for incentive compensation as legal 
conditions worsen.  The data in fact indicated that legal and cultural conditions by far have 
the  most  statistically  and  economically  significant  effect  on  compensation,  even  in 
comparison to the role of the managers education and experience, as well as a variety of 
other fund characteristics including fund size and industry and stage focus. 
 
  While  risk  adverse  fund  managers  trade-off  performance  fees  for  fixed  fees  in 
countries with poor laws, risk adverse institutional investors are also more likely to require 
clawbacks of fund manager fees in the event of poor fund performance.  In other words, 
there is an asymmetry in fund manager compensation in relation to legal conditions: fund 
managers have higher fixed fees and lower incentive fees in countries with weak legal 20 
 
conditions, but fund managers in countries with weak legal conditions are also more likely 
to face the downside risk of a clawback on their fees.   
 
That  legal  conditions  affect  the  payment  conditions  of  fund  managers  and 
institutional investors across countries has a number of implications for future research.  
Legal and cultural conditions influence fund manager compensation, which in turn could 
have implications for fund investment selection, returns and the development of private 
equity markets across countries.  The comparative importance for law versus culture in 
compensation contracts versus the role of law directly in other aspects of fund management 
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Table 1.  Definition of Variables 24 
 
This table defines the variables considered in this paper.  Summary statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Variable  Description 
Compensation Variables   
Fixed Management Fee %  The fund managers‟ fixed fee as a percentage of the funds raised from the institutional investors. 
Carried Interest 
Performance Fee % 
The fund managers‟ carried interest performance fees as a percentage of the profits earned by the fund. 
Clawbacks 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund allows for clawbacks against the fund managers but not any 
of the fund investors.  A clawback enables the fund investors to lower the fee received by the fund 
manager in the event of poor performance of the fund. 
Cash Distributions 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund managers are required to distribute cash to the institutional 
investors instead of shares (for realized capital gains from investments in entrepreneurial firms). 
Legal and Market Conditions 
Country Legality Index 
Weighted average of following factors (based on Berkowitz et al., 2003): efficiency of judicial system, 
rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights (as per La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  Where the weighted average is not available, especially for less developed 
countries,  an approximate index  is derived by multiplying  the country‟s GNP per population with a 
constant variable obtained by carrying out a regression of the legality indices available.  Higher 
numbers indicate 'better' legal systems.   The log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a 
diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Legal Origin 
Dummy variables equal to 1 for a fund organized in countries of different legal origin, including 
English, French, German and Scandinavian. 
Hofstede Cultural 
Dimensions 
Hofstede's study demonstrated that there are national and regional cultural groupings that affect the 
behavior of societies and organizations, and that these are persistent across time. Hofstede has found 
five dimensions of culture in his study of national work related values. The dimensions are: Small vs. 
large power distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism,  Masculinity vs. Femininity, Weak vs. strong 
uncertainty avoidance and Long vs. short term orientation. 
GNP per Capita  The GNP per Capita of the country in which the fund is formed.  The log of this variable is used. 
MSCI Index 
 The country-specific MSCI Index taken for the year prior to that when fund raising commenced . The 
year prior to fund raising is deemed to be most relevant as decisions to invest in private equity by 
institutional investors will be based on available economic indicators.    The log of (1+MSCI) is used 
in the empirics to account for a diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Vintage Year of Fund  The year fund raising commences 
Outbound offshore 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for a fund located offshore that obtains its capital from investors from a 
certain jurisdiction but fund investments are made primarily in assets other than in the jurisdiction of 
the fund and the fund investors. With reference to United States jurisdictional boundaries, a fund will 
be considered to be an outbound offshore fund if it obtains capital from United States investors, but it 
invests outside the United States. 
Inbound offshore 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for a fund located offshore that obtains its capital from investors from 
various jurisdictions but fund investments are made primarily in assets in a certain jurisdiction. With 
reference to United States jurisdictional boundaries, an inbound offshore fund will be a fund located 
offshore which invests primarily in assets within the United States yet obtains its capital from non-25 
 
United States investors. 
Tax Difference 
A variable equal to, for top marginal tax rates, (Income Tax Rate – Capital Gains Tax Rate) * (Limited 
Partnership Dummy Variable), for partnerships for which carried interest is taxed at the capital gains 
rate, and fixed management fees are taxed at the income tax rate. 
Fund Manager Characteristics 
Percentage of Legally 
Trained Fund Managers 
Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who are legally trained, or 
are qualified as lawyers.  Where managers have some extent of legal training, that fraction of the 
extent of legal training is also reflected in the data. 
Percentage of MBA/CFA 
Trained Fund Managers 
Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained an MBA 
or CFA qualifications.  Where managers have some extent of such training, that fraction is also 
reflected in the data. 
Percentage of PhD 
(Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained a PhD in 
a science based discipline.   Where managers have some extent of formal scientific training, that 
fraction of training is also reflected in the data. 
Percentage of PhD (Non-
Science) Trained Fund 
Managers 
Percentage of principal fund managers with investment making decisions who have obtained a PhD in 
a non-science based discipline.   Where managers have some extent of advanced Ph.D. studies, that 
fraction of training is also reflected in the data. 
Average # Years of 
Relevant Work Experience 
of Principal Fund 
Managers 
Average number of years relevant work experience of principal fund managers at the time of fund 




The fund size, or amount of funds raised in US Dollar. Where the amount is provided in a local 
currency, an exchange rate as at December 2003 is used for conversion of such amounts into US Dollar 
equivalents.  The log of this variable is used in the empirics to account for a diminishing effect with 
larger numbers. 
Bank Institutional Investors  The proportion of banks as the fund‟s institutional investors 
Government Investors  The proportion of government agencies or ministries as institutional investors 
Limited Partnership Funds  A dummy variable equal to 1 for the fund being organized as a limited partnership. 
Industry Market / Book 
The industry market/book ratio of the industries for which the fund has invested in. The industry 
market/book ratio of 5 general categories, Biotechnology and  Medical,  Communications and Internet, 
Computers and Electronics,  Manufacturing and others, is obtained by averaging the total book value 
of specific industries falling within the general categories.  The log of this variable is used in the 
empirics to account for a diminishing effect with larger numbers. 
Early Stage Investee Focus 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for funds which indicate a focus on financing provided to firms in their 
early / expansion stages of development (not late stages or buyout stages).  More specific stages of 
focus were not tractable due to international differences in the definition of stage focus, as well as style 
drift that is often observed among different stages of development. 
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Table 2.  Summary of the Data 
This table summarizes the different characteristics of the funds forming the sample. Funds are classified by country in which they were formed and countries are grouped in two categories: Civil Law 
and Common Law.  The average values of each variable per country are reported (except for Clawbacks and Cash distribution, where the number of funds is reported).  
Table 2.a Summary of the Data (Civil Law) 
   Total  Belgium   Brazil  Finland  France  Germany  Italy  Luxembourg   Mexico  Netherlands  Netherlands 
Antilles 
Philippines  Spain  Switzerland 
Number of funds  69  3  4  5  21  6  3  1  2  11  4  3  3  3 
Compensation                           
Management fees (%)  2.34  2.33  3.50  2.50  2.14  2.50  2.50  2.00  3.00  2.32  0.80  2.00  2.33  2 
Carried Interest (%)  18.82  20.00  10.75  20.00  19.33  19.17  20.00  20.00  20.00  20.09  15.00  20.00  20.00  20.33 
Clawbacks  15  0  2  1  9  1  1  0.00  0.00  1  0  0  0  0 
Cash Distribution  48  1  4  4  17  3  3  1.00  1.00  4  4  1  3  2 
Legal and Market Conditions                         
Legality Index  19.26  20.82  14.09  21.49  19.67  20.44  17.23  21.91  12.82  21.67  21.67  8.51  17.13  21.91 
GNP per Capita  22668.89  21650.00  6788.22  32134.24  24467.97  27178.75  20324.97  35760.00  6772.10  25058.18  20950.00  20981.60  24938.67  37156.23 
MSCI Index  6047.13  0.19  60109.48  657.98  1123.03  379.17  743.86  0.01  12750.97  278.23  0.16  935.16  1042.07  592.36 
Vintage Year of fund  2000.70  1999.33  2002.00  2003.80  1999.00  2001.33  2000.33  1997.00  2003.00  1999.73  2000.25  1999.00  2004.67  1999.67 
Outbound Offshore   0.19  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.17  0.00  1.00  0.00  0.09  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Inbound Offshore  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Fund Manager Characteristics                         
Proportion of MBA/CFA 
(%) 
67.40  58.33  83.75  61.00  39.68  65.00  38.33  80.00  90.00  61.82  80.00  100.00  61.67  56.67 
Proportion of Ph.D (%)  13.38  33.33  0.00  2.20  24.35  5.83  16.67  5.00  0.50  7.36  5.00  33.33  17.00  23.33 
Proportion of Legally 
trained manager (%) 
7.38  8.33  13.75  5.00  13.46  2.83  21.67  5.00  1.00  10.91  0.00  0.00  4.00  10.00 
Years Relevant Work 
Experience 
15.33  11.33  15.50  13.60  14.14  15.83  15.67  10.00  25.00  12.18  14.00  25.00  14.00  13.00 
Funds Raised  1.87E+08  1.43E+08  2.45E+08  9.91E+07  2.19E+08  1.73E+08  2.18E+08  3.60E+07  4.79E+07  3.93E+07  3.04E+08  5.30E+08  2.30E+08  1.47E+08 
Bank Institutional 
Investors 
0.20  0.56  0.08  0.01  0.30  0.45  0.35  0.24  0.00  0.18  0.10  0.04  0.12  0.16 
Government Investors  0.06  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.21  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Pension Investors  0.11  0.05  0.50  0.21  0.19  0.02  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.11  0.10  0.00  0.10  0.03 
Endowment Investors  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.16  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.10  0.00  0.04  0.05 
limited Partnership Funds  0.55  0.00  0.50  0.80  0.62  0.83  0.67  0.00  0.50  0.27  1.00  1.00  0.67  0.33 
Industry Market/Book  3.84  3.89  3.19  4.01  3.44  3.52  2.93  4.75  1.88  3.39  4.82  4.21  4.73  5.18 
Early-stage Investee Focus  0.37  0.33  0.00  0.40  0.29  0.50  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.27  0.00  1.00  0.67  0.33 
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Table 2.b Summary of the Data ( Common Law) 
   Total  Australia  Canada  Cayman Islands  India  Malaysia  New Zealand  Singapore  South Africa  U.K   U.S.A  
Number of funds  54  5  3  2  3  8  1  1  5  12  14 
Compensation                       
Management fees (%)  2.30  1.90  2.00  2.50  3.67  2.25  2.32  2.00  2.19  2.08  2.08 
Carried Interest (%)  17.96  20.00  20.00  12.50  18.67  19.50  20.09  20.00  11.50  19.67  17.64 
Clawbacks  18  1  1  0  2  5  1  0.00  2.00  2  4 
Cash Distribution  40  4  2  1  3  3  4  1.00  3.00  9  10 
Legal and Market Conditions                     
Legality Index  18.84  20.44  21.13  20.41  12.8  16.67  21.67  19.53  14.51  20.41  20.85 
GNP per Capita  17868.93  29222.88  22602.23  18060.00  670.00  5176.54  25058.18  20981.60  3331.82  25108.51  28477.50 
MSCI Index  409.67  681.77  534.28  0.14  281.80  63.72  278.23  935.16  177.00  783.85  360.73 
Vintage Year of fund  2001.34  2001.60  2002.33  1999.00  2004.67  2002.00  1999.73  1999.00  2002.80  2002.00  2000.29 
Outbound Offshore   0.14  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.09  0.00  0.20  0.33  0.21 
Inbound Offshore  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.33  0.00  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.25  0.07 
Fund Manager Characteristics                   
Proportion of MBA/CFA (%)  78.38  66.67  64.00  90.00  100.00  80.00  61.82  100.00  79.40  66.08  75.79 
Proportion of Ph.D (%)  9.04  10.40  3.33  2.50  2.00  7.13  7.36  33.33  1.60  14.58  8.21 
Proportion of Legally trained 
manager (%) 
8.74  15.67  13.00  2.50  33.33  3.13  10.91  0.00  0.20  4.50  4.17 
Years Relevant Work 
Experience 
15.90  19.00  15.33  17.00  11.00  15.81  12.18  25.00  12.80  14.25  16.64 
Funds Raised  1.51E+08  2.45E+08  5.66E+07  2.45E+08  4.90E+07  3.40E+07  3.93E+07  5.30E+08  3.88E+07  1.63E+08  1.10E+08 
Bank Institutional Investors  0.11  0.11  0.19  0.09  0.03  0.18  0.18  0.04  0.08  0.09  0.11 
Government Investors  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.34  0.24  0.21  0.02  0.27  0.13  0.06 
Pension Investors  0.20  0.67  0.40  0.05  0.02  0.17  0.11  0.00  0.22  0.16  0.19 
Endowment Investors  0.04  0.08  0.15  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.07 
limited Partnership Funds  0.59  0.40  0.67  1.00  0.33  0.13  0.27  1.00  0.40  0.83  0.86 
Industry Market/Book  4.52  4.43  2.95  4.37  10.22  3.72  3.39  4.21  3.92  3.99  3.96 




Table 3.  Summary Statistics 
  Median  Mean  Min  Max  Number of 
observations 
Legal and Market Conditions 
   
  
Management fees (%)  2.5  2.320  0.8  5  123 
Carried Interest (%)  20  18.32  6  21  123 
Clawbacks  0  0.276  0  1  34 
Cash Distribution  1  0.707  0  1  87 
legality Index  20.41  19.167  8.51  21.91  123 
English Legal Origin  0  0.455  0  1  56 
French Legal Origin  0  0.374  0  1  46 
German Legal Origin  0  0.073  0  1  9 
Scandin Legal Origin  0  0.041  0  1  5 
GNP per Capita  23,168.4  21,400.170  480.9  46,543.7  123 
MSCI Index  483.446  2673.854  -0.629713043  173293.1  123 
Year of Fund Formation  2001  2000.919  1980  2008  123 
Outbound Offshore   0  0.163  0  1  20 
Inbound Offshore  0  0.073  0  1  9 
Fund Manager Characteristics        
Proportion of MBA/CFA (%)  80  64.794  0  100  123 
Proportion of Legally trained manager (%)  3  8.572  0  100  123 
Proportion of Ph.D (%)  5  12.751  0  100  123 
Years Relevant Work Experience  15  14.833  4  40  123 
Fund Characteristics          
Funds Raised  70,900,000  144,667,817.7  263,377.5  930,000,000  123 
Bank Institutional Investors  0.1  0.179  0  1  123 
Government Investors  0.03125  0.102  0  1  123 
Pension Investors  0.1  0.178  0  1  123 
Endowment Investors  0  0.054  0  0.5  123 
limited Partnership Funds  1  0.585  0  1  72 
Industry Market/Book  3.528  3.945  0.82  24.74  123 





Table 4. Correlations 
This table presents correlation across the variables defined in Table 1. 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25) 
(1)  Management Fees 
(%) 
1.00                                                 
(2)  Carried Interest 
(%) 
-0.28  1.00                                               
(3)  Clawbacks  0.25  -0.09  1.00                                             
(4)  Cash 
Distributions 
-0.05  -0.10  0.00  1.00                                           
(5)  legality Index  -0.62  0.51  -0.27  -0.16  1.00                                         
(6)  English Legal 
Origin 
-0.12  -0.04  0.06  -0.06  -0.10  1.00                                       
(7)  French Legal 
Origin 
-0.03  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.08  -0.71  1.00                                     
(8)  German Legal 
Origin 
0.05  0.11  -0.10  -0.09  0.17  -0.26  -0.22  1.00                                   
(9)  Scandinavian 
Legal Origin 
0.05  0.11  -0.04  0.04  0.16  -0.19  -0.16  -0.06  1.00                                 
(10)  GNP per Capita  -0.42  0.42  -0.21  0.18  0.75  -0.21  0.06  0.23  0.20  1.00                               
(11)  MSCI Index  0.18  -0.28  -0.04  0.10  -0.23  -0.10  -0.10  -0.04  -0.03  -0.14  1.00                             
(12)  Year of fund 
formation 
0.03  -0.04  0.08  0.18  -0.14  0.17  -0.29  -0.03  0.15  0.14  0.17  1.00                           
(13)  Outbound 
Offshore  
-0.26  -0.12  -0.12  0.19  0.08  0.08  -0.07  0.05  0.02  -0.01  -0.07  0.06  1.00                         
(14)  Inbound Offshore  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.18  -0.03  0.18  -0.09  -0.08  -0.06  -0.12  0.00  0.06  0.13  1.00                       
(15)  Proportion of 
MBA 
-0.01  -0.09  -0.10  -0.17  -0.09  0.35  -0.38  0.04  -0.03  -0.28  0.12  0.00  0.12  0.14  1.00                     
(16)  Proportion of 
Ph.D 
0.17  0.07  0.21  -0.01  -0.11  -0.12  0.18  -0.09  -0.05  -0.01  -0.03  0.10  -0.22  -0.14  -0.19  1.00                   
(17)  Legally trained 
Managers 
0.08  -0.01  0.01  0.07  -0.10  -0.21  0.29  -0.07  -0.11  0.02  -0.08  -0.11  -0.02  0.08  -0.30  0.01  1.00                 
(18)  Work Experience  0.06  -0.15  0.02  0.06  -0.05  0.22  -0.19  -0.02  -0.05  -0.02  0.12  0.14  -0.09  0.03  -0.08  -0.08  -0.02  1.00               
(19)  funds Raised  -0.16  -0.02  -0.08  0.19  0.10  -0.14  0.10  -0.02  -0.05  0.16  0.11  -0.04  0.02  -0.04  -0.03  -0.12  -0.03  0.12  1.00             
(20)  Bank Investors  -0.07  0.12  -0.11  -0.04  0.07  -0.27  0.23  0.22  -0.14  0.09  -0.02  -0.20  -0.14  -0.13  -0.11  -0.11  0.08  -0.01  0.16  1.00           
(21)  Government 
Investors 
0.21  -0.12  0.22  -0.10  -0.17  0.11  -0.06  -0.07  0.01  -0.30  -0.03  0.07  0.09  0.08  0.02  0.17  -0.06  -0.09  -0.21  -0.22  1.00         
(22)  Pension Investors  0.03  -0.09  -0.06  0.25  -0.04  0.13  -0.11  -0.20  0.03  0.08  0.14  0.02  -0.13  -0.12  -0.08  -0.03  -0.02  0.07  0.09  -0.10  -0.21  1.00       
(23)  Endowment 
Investors 
-0.11  0.06  -0.04  0.14  0.21  -0.09  0.07  -0.10  0.26  0.25  -0.07  -0.04  0.15  0.03  -0.14  -0.09  0.03  -0.02  0.13  -0.05  -0.13  0.23  1.00     
(24)  Limited 
Partnership Fund 
-0.13  -0.03  -0.07  0.22  0.11  0.04  -0.10  -0.02  0.09  0.21  0.08  0.08  0.15  0.05  -0.08  -0.07  0.06  0.05  0.04  -0.08  -0.14  0.14  0.21  1.00   
(25)  Industry 
Market/Book 
0.06  0.02  0.09  0.00  -0.07  0.11  -0.12  0.04  0.01  -0.07  -0.10  0.03  0.07  -0.07  0.05  0.41  -0.06  -0.14  -0.10  -0.06  0.36  -0.08  -0.03  -0.10  1.00 
(26)  Early-Stage fund 
focus 
0.10  0.19  -0.02  0.16  0.00  -0.05  -0.04  0.08  0.04  0.11  -0.08  0.07  0.04  -0.12  -0.13  0.15  0.05  -0.17  -0.01  0.12  -0.06  -0.07  0.03  0.06  0.13 30 
 
 
Table 5.  Regression Analyses of Management Fees 
This table presents OLS regressions of the fixed management fee % for the private investment fund managers.  The sample comprises 123 funds from 23 countries in Africa, Australasia, Europe, and North and 
South America. 
   Model-1-  Model-2-  Model-3-  Model-4-  Model-5-  Model-6-  Model-7- 
  
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
                             
Constant  6.088***  0.660  6.030***  0.739  5.744***  0.713  7.391***  0.882  22.000  24.410  6.685***  0.819  7.985***  1.049 
 
Legal Conditions 
                         
legality Index  -0.140***  0.017  -0.145***  0.035  -0.133***  0.0173  -0.105**  0.0455  -0.139***  0.016         
Efficiency of Judiciary System                      0.116  0.077 
Rule of Law                          -0.0539  0.086 
Corruption                      -0.239***  0.050  -0.281***  0.075 
Risk of Expropriation                        -0.112  0.199 
Risk of Contract Repudiation                      -0.0609  0.164 
English Legal Origin             -0.660***  0.229      -0.344  0.220     
French Legal Origin            -0.482**  0.236      -0.109  0.229     
German Legal Origin            0.00385  0.296      0.300  0.277     
Scandinavian Legal Origin            -0.028  0.322      0.428  0.309     
 
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
                       
Power Distance Index                        -0.0161***  0.004 
Individualism                          -0.00966**  0.004 
Masculinity                          -0.00151  0.004 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index                      0.0104**  0.004 
 
Market Conditions 
                         
GNP per Capita    0.0173  0.109      -0.433***  0.057      -0.136*  0.081     
MSCI Index          0.0143  0.016  0.0218  0.017      0.0139  0.016     
Year of Fund Formation                -0.00808  0.012         
Outbound-Offshore Fund                 -0.381***  0.132         
Inbound-Offshore Fund                 0.139  0.185         




Table 5.  (Continued) 
 
   Model-1-  Model-2-  Model-3-  Model-4-  Model-5-  Model-6-  Model-7- 
  
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
 
Fund Manager Characteristics 
                       
Proportion of Ph.D  0.000675  0.003  0.000622  0.003  0.000641  0.003  0.00162  0.003      -0.000455  0.002  0.00167  0.003 
Proportion of Legally  
Trained Fund Managers 
      0.00477  0.003      0.00156  0.003     
Proportion of MBA/CFA            -0.00118  0.002      -0.00119  0.002     
Work Experience of Principal 
 Fund Managers 
  0.0046  0.010  0.0164  0.011      0.00526  0.010     
 
Fund Characteristics 
                         
Funds Raised  -0.0551*  0.033  -0.0564  0.035  -0.0525  0.035  -0.0269  0.036  -0.0466  0.032  -0.0424  0.033  -0.0646**  0.031 
Banks Institutional Investors        0.0394  0.206  -0.0685  0.217      -0.0959  0.198     
Government Investors        0.438  0.285  0.239  0.288      0.502*  0.268     
Limited Partnership Funds                -0.0215  0.099         
Industry 
Market/Book 
-0.0809  0.110  -0.0788  0.115  -0.0969  0.115  -0.187  0.117      -0.155  0.107  -0.109  0.104 
Early-Stage Investee Focus                0.191*  0.104         
                                        
Observations  123  123  123  123  123  123  123 
R-squared  0.405  0.405  0.42  0.478  0.459  0.569  0.520 
Ajusted R
2  0.385  0.374  0.38  0.41  0.426  0.509  0.468 
F-Statistic  20.07  13.17  10.33  7.053  13.92  9.420  9.932 
LogLikelihood  -96.81  -96.79  -95.21  -88.8  -90.99  -76.96  -83.59 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 32 
 
 
Table 6.  Regression Analyses of Carried Interest  
This table presents OLS regressions of the carried interest performance fee % for the private investment fund managers.  The sample comprises 123 funds from 23 countries in Africa, Australasia, Europe, and North and 
South America. 
   Model -8-  Model -9-  Model -10-  Model -11-  Model -12-  Model -13-  Model -14- 
   Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
                       
 
     
        Constant  9.083***  3.366  9.063**  3.836  11.46***  3.707  11.77**  5.309  -36.31  126.800  5.243  4.983  -8.684*  4.873 
 
Legal Conditions 
                         
legality Index  0.563***  0.087  0.550***  0.179  0.568***  0.090  0.680***  0.249  0.591***  0.085         
Efficiency of Judiciary System                      1.915***  0.358 
Rule of Law                          -0.945**  0.398 
Corruption                      0.00346  0.306  -0.752**  0.346 
Risk of Expropriation                        0.932  0.924 
Risk of Contract Repudiation                      1.677**  0.760 
English Legal Origin               0.933  1.366      2.536*  1.337     
French Legal Origin              -0.130  1.386      1.389  1.396     
German Legal Origin              0.648  1.658      1.948  1.685     
Scandinavian Legal Origin              0.969  1.872      2.900  1.883     
 
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
                       
Power Distance Index                        0.0208  0.020 
Individualism                          -0.0328  0.021 
Masculinity                          -0.000426  0.018 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index                      0.0691***  0.019 
 
Market Conditions 
                         
GNP per Capita      0.134  0.563      -0.379  0.776      1.564***  0.494     
MSCI Index          0.117  0.082  0.111  0.101      -0.00204  0.096     
Year of Fund Formation                  0.0222  0.063         
Outbound-Offshore Fund                   -1.558**  0.684         
Inbound-Offshore Fund                   -1.468  0.962         




Table 6. (Continued)  
   Model -8-  Model -9-  Model -10-  Model -11-  Model -12-  Model -13-  Model -14- 
   Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
 
Fund Manager Characteristics 
                       
Proportion of Ph.D  0.00671  0.013  0.00562  0.013  0.00182  0.013  0.00725*  0.015      0.00338  0.015  -0.00834  0.012 
Proportion of Legally Trained 
Fund Managers 
            0.0312*  0.018      0.0281  0.019     
Proportion of MBA/CFA              -0.00470  0.011      -0.00194  0.011     
Work Experience of Principal 
Fund Managers 




                         
Funds Raised  -0.0916  0.171  -0.113  0.178  -0.187  0.184  -0.107  0.193  -0.0676  0.168  -0.129  0.201  -0.0624  0.146 
Banks Institutional Investors          1.103  1.072  1.636  1.165      1.639  1.206     
Government Investors          -0.443  1.483  -0.960  1.568      -0.241  1.633     
Limited Partnership Funds          -0.0122  0.600  -0.400  0.637             
Industry Market/Book                  -0.543  0.516  -0.149  0.653  -0.0623  0.483 

















R-squared  0.260  0.286  0.297  0.331  0.345  0.284  0.536 
Ajusted R
2  0.241  0.249  0.248  0.237  0.305  0.184  0.485 
F-Statistic  13.95  7.758  6.024  3.523  8.663  2.830  10.58 
Log Likelihood  -301.1  -298.9  -298.0  -295.0  -293.6  -299.1  -272.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 34 
 
 
Table 7.  Regression Analyses of Clawbacks against Fund Managers 
This table presents logit regressions of the probability that a fund has a clawback against the private investment fund manager (and without clawbacks against any of the fund investors).  We report the marginal 
effects, not the standard logit coefficients, in order to highlight economic significance (and hence do not report the constant even through the model includes a constant).  The sample comprises 123 funds from 23 
countries in Africa, Australasia, Europe, and North and South America.   
   Model -15-  Model -16-  Model -17-  Model -18-  Model -19-  Model -20-  Model -21- 













Error  Marg-effect  Std. 
Error 
Marg-
effect  Std. Error  Marg-effect  Std. 
Error 
Legal Conditions 
                       
  
legality Index  -0.0365***  0.067  -0.0165*  0.145  -0.0321**  0.070  -0.0352**  0.076  -0.0342***  0.067          
Efficiency of Judiciary System                      -0.0657  0.434 
Rule of Law                          -0.0012  0.407 
Corruption                      -0.0558**  0.142  0.05853  0.347 
Risk of Expropriation                        0.11183  0.923 
Risk of Contract Repudiation                      -0.15942  0.772 
English Legal Origin             0.069018  0.519      0.06428  0.515      
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions                          
Power Distance Index                        0.0118***  0.025 
Individualism                          0.0087  0.028 
Masculinity                          0.0024482  0.022 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index                      -0.0028138  0.023 
Market Conditions                            
GNP per Capita    -0.07046  0.456                      
MSCI Index          0.0011  0.075  -0.0055  0.079      -0.00143*  0.077      
Year of Fund Formation                0.00673  0.057          
offshore Fund (Inbound or 
Outbound)  
-0.02119  0.525  -0.03971  0.542  -0.07482  0.603  -0.03071  0.622  -0.02227  0.527  -0.03480  0.622      
Fund Manager Characteristics                          
Proportion of Ph.D  -0.00026  0.011  0.00001  0.011  0.00012  0.011  -0.00066  0.012      -0.00077  0.012  -0.00117  0.012 
Proportion of Legally Trained Fund Managers        0.00409  0.016      0.00370  0.017      
Proportion of MBA/CFA            -0.00235  0.009      -0.00223  0.009      
Work Experience of Principal Fund Managers    0.00208  0.042  0.0006  0.045      -0.00075  0.045      
Fund Characteristics                            
Funds Raised  -0.01540  0.140  -0.00759  0.151  0.00398  0.165  0.00673  0.170  -0.01480  0.142  0.00094  0.165  -0.01442  0.160 
Banks Institutional Investors        -0.13388  1.014  -0.10134  1.083      -0.10807  1.087      
Government Investors        0.41899  1.231  0.35317  1.308      0.4239*  1.283      
Limited Partnership Funds                -0.0315  0.436          
Industry Market/Book  0.01823  0.461  0.00209  0.478  -0.01102  0.512  -0.05047  0.545      -0.05325  0.540  0.02423  0.491 
Early-Stage Investee Focus                -0.01545  0.464          
Observations  123  123  123  123  123  123  123 
Pseudo R
2  0.2622  0.2666  0.2927  0.326  0.2653  0.312  0.132 
Chi-squared  9.025  9.665  13.44  18.33  9.471  16.25  19.21 
Log Likelihood  -68.00  -67.68  -65.79  -63.35  -67.78  -64.39  -62.91 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 8.  Regression Analyses of Cash versus Share Distributions 
This table presents logit regressions of the probability that a fund mandates cash distributions to institutional investors, such that the fund manager does not have the opportunity to distribute shares.  We report the 
marginal effects, not the standard logit coefficients, in order to highlight economic significance (and hence do not report the constant even through the model includes a constant).  The sample comprises 123 funds 
from 23 countries in Africa, Australasia, Europe, and North and South America. 
   Model -22-  Model -23-  Model -24-  Model -25-  Model -26-  Model -27-  Model -28- 
   M-effects 
Std. 
Error  M-effects 
Std. 
Error  M-effects 
Std. 
Error  M-effects 
Std. 
Error  M-effects 
Std. 
Error  M-effects 
Std. 




                       
  
legality Index  -0.03519**  0.092  -0.1913***  0.289  -0.02522  0.122  -0.02718**  0.108  -0.03756**  0.099          
Efficiency of Judiciary System                      -0.00444  0.401 
Rule of Law                          -0.13884  0.572 
Corruption                      -0.09489**  0.360  -0.05036  0.441 
Risk of Expropriation                        0.43741*  1.450 
Risk of Contract Repudiation                      -0.29640  1.081 
English Legal Origin             -0.06245  1.178      -0.10018  0.760      
Hofstede Cultural Dimensions                          
Power Distance Index                        -0.00637  0.025 
Individualism                          -0.00231  0.024 
Masculinity                          0.00071  0.018 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index                      0.00380  0.021 
Market Conditions                            
GNP per Capita    0.49245***  0.755                      
MSCI Index          0.09277***  0.119  0.08924**  0.126      0.08706***  0.135      
Year of Fund Formation                0.01419  0.063          
offshore Fund  
(Offshore or 
Outbound)  
0.21701***  0.671  0.25136***  0.763  0.32607***  0.957  0.31924*  0.776  0.20706***  0.691  0.2980***  1.031      
Fund Manager Characteristics                          
Proportion of Ph.D  0.00146  0.012  -0.00064  0.013  -0.0025  0.016  -0.00314***  0.013      -0.00334  0.017  0.00166  0.013 
Proportion of Legally Trained Fund Managers        -0.00088***  0.018      -0.00266  0.024      
Proportion of MBA/CFA            -0.0010***  0.009      -0.00114  0.013      
Work Experience of Principal Fund Managers    -0.0025  0.058  0.00188***   0.048      -0.00227  0.070      
Fund Characteristics                            
Funds Raised  0.06553  0.145  0.01977  0.157  0.00147  0.230  -0.01341**  0.166  0.05402**  0.149  -0.01442  0.231  0.06853**    0.153 
Banks Institutional Investors        -0.01196  1.222  0.02012  1.010      -0.03355  1.364      
Government Investors        0.05570  1.872  -0.1408  1.309      -0.15327  1.922      
Limited Partnership Funds                0.18475**  0.459          
Industry Market/Book  -0.07811  0.477  -0.00839  0.574  -0.15149  0.708  -0.02883  0.573      -0.02988  0.763  -0.08192  0.521 
Early-Stage Investee Focus                0.14464*  0.526          
Observations  123  123  123  123  123  123  123 
Pseudo R
2  0.323  0.495  0.664  0.405  0.381  0.496  0.147 
Chi-squared  18.29  43.84  68.97  30.51  26.85  73.80  21.84 
Log Likelihood  -65.21  -52.44  -39.87  -59.10  -60.93  -37.46  -63.44 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 